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Preface 
 
A symposium was held on 23 February 2006 in the Michio Morishima room at 
STICERD to discuss aspects of Japanese and British royalty. 
 
Professor Ben-Ami Shillony discussed the future succession to the Japanese 
throne in the light of the current debate about female succession, outlined in 
his recent book Enigma of the Emperors (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2005).  
Dr Best analysed the changing Anglo-Japanese court relationship which had 
originally been underpinned by the Anglo-Japanese alliance but had become 
a secondary factor by the 1930s. 
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Shillony: Paper examines how Japan’s imperial dynasty dependent on the 
male line of succession has lasted so long and analyses how it will overcome 
its present difficulties.  An Advisory Panel was created to recommend future 
policy to the Koizumi cabinet but its report in 2005 was criticized.  The 
impasse over the Panel’s report was broken by the birth of a son in 
September 2006 to Princess Kiko, wife of Prince Akishino. 
 
Best:  Paper explains why the royal relationship with Japan became so 
important to Britain.  During the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-23), relations 
between the two Courts were cordial.  The ending of the alliance did not lead 
to immediate substantial change.  But as political relations deteriorated in the 
‘thirties, Court diplomacy did not yield important results, though officials 
continued experimenting. 
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The Japanese Imperial Institution: Crisis and Continuity 
 
Ben-Ami Shillony 
 
Introduction 
In many ways, the present Japanese monarchy resembles West European 
monarchies, where the king or the queen is a symbolic figure. However, there 
are significant differences. On the one hand, the status of the emperor of 
Japan is lower than that of all other kings or queens. Unlike the Queen of 
England, he is neither the sovereign, nor the head of state, nor the 
commander in chief of the armed forces, nor the head of a national church, 
nor the apex of an aristocracy, nor the owner of big land estates. He is 
merely, as the constitution states, "the symbol of the state and of the unity of 
the people" (Article 1), who performs the functions of a head of state with the 
advice and approval of the cabinet (Article 7).  
 
On the other hand, the status of the emperor of Japan is higher than that of 
other monarchs. His title "emperor" suggests that he occupies a superior rank, 
and the fact that he is today the only emperor in the world puts him in a 
unique position. The Shinto rituals that he performs, not mentioned in the 
constitution or the laws, are a continuation of the rites that Japanese 
emperors have been performing for at least a millennium and a half. Believed 
to be the descendants of the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami, they were the 
intermediaries between the realm and the gods. The imperial dynasty, which 
has no name, was usually weak and manipulated by others, but it was so 
sacred that no one ever dared to depose it or replace it. It is therefore the 
oldest dynasty in the world, and the only one that the Japanese can 
remember. Except for a period of 56 years in the fourteenth century, in which 
it split into the Northern and Southern Courts, it remained united and there 
was always one emperor whom everyone recognized. 
 
As the emperors had little else to do, their main function was to exist and to 
ensure the continuity of their "unbroken line of ten thousand generations" 
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(bansei ikkei). The well being of Japan as a country blessed by the gods 
(shinkoku) depended on their male-line continuity. However, ensuring this 
continuity, when other aristocratic families often died out, was not an easy 
task. How did the imperial dynasty manage to survive for such a long time, 
why has its continuity become endangered in recent years, how has this 
problem been solved for the moment, and what long-range solutions are 
being considered? These are the questions which this essay will try to 
address. 
 
Concubines Guarantee Progeny 
The classical method of kings and emperors all over the world to guarantee 
progeny was to maintain a harem. Keeping a large number of concubines was 
the privilege and status symbol of royalty in many countries. In Japan, as in 
China, emperors had, in addition to the chief consort, other wives of various 
ranks. Access to many women was to assure that there would always be a 
son to continue the dynasty. In Japan, not only emperors maintained harems, 
but also shoguns and high aristocrats. A shogun's harem was usually larger 
than that of the emperor, because he had the means to keep more 
concubines. 
 
This system worked most of the time well, but it had its problems. Maintaining 
many concubines could result in too many sons, a situation which put a 
burden on court resources and created succession feuds. In the Heian period, 
when the harems were big and the number of imperial sons was large, the 
emperors from time to time "pruned" their progeny, by giving some of their 
sons or grandsons estates and surnames and establishing them as 
independent commoner (shinka) families. This was the origin of the Taira and 
the Minamoto clans.  
 
But there was also the opposite danger of too few sons. Infant mortality in the 
imperial family was always high due to inbreeding, the low age of mothers, 
and the ban on doctors to touch the bodies of imperial babies. In the late Edo 
period, when harems were small, the number of imperial sons barely provided 
continuity. Thus, of the seventeen children of Emperor Kōkaku (r. 1780-1817), 
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only one son survived infancy to become Emperor Ninkō (r. 1817-46). Of 
Emperor Ninkō’s fifteen children, only one son survived to become Emperor 
Kōmei (r. 1846-67). Of Emperor Kōmei’s six children, only one son survived to 
become Emperor Meiji, and of Emperor Meiji’s fourteen children only one 
sickly son survived to become Emperor Taishō.  
 
The chief consorts of all the emperors in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century were either barren or lost their children. As a result, all the emperors 
born at that time, from Ninkō to Taishō, were the sons of concubines. In each 
case, the future heir was adopted by the chief consort to become her formal 
son. But other kinds of adoption, that were common among ordinary families, 
could not be practiced in the palace. As imperial succession was based on 
biological ("blood") male-line continuity, the emperor could adopt a son from 
within his own family, but he could not adopt a son from another family. This 
limitation preserved the monopoly of the imperial family and prevented other 
powerful families, like the Fujiwara or the Tokugawa, from putting their sons 
on the throne through marriage or adoption.  
 
Collateral Families Back Up the Main Line 
Concubines were not always a solution. If the emperor himself was sterile, or 
if he died before producing a son, no concubine could help. In the Kamakura 
period, a system was developed, by which an emperor's son, who was not 
destined to succeed him, was sometimes established as the head of a 
collateral princely family (miyake). From then on, he and his heirs, the heads 
of that family, would carry the title of imperial prince (shinnō) and would have 
the right to ascend the throne in case the main line failed to produce an heir.  
 
This system was activated in 1428, when Emperor Shōkō (r. 1413-28) died at 
the age of 26 without leaving a successor, and the nine-year old head of the 
collateral Fushimi family, a great-grandson of the Northern-Court Emperor 
Sukō  (r. 1348-1351), ascended the throne as Emperor Go-Hanazono (r. 
1428-65). The last time that this system was implemented was in 1780, when 
Emperor Go-Momozono (r. 1771-79) died at the age of 21 without leaving an 
heir, and the seven-year old head of the collateral Kan’in family, a great-
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grandson of Emperor Higashiyama (r. 1687-1709), ascended the throne as 
Emperor Kōkaku (r. 1780-1816). From Emperor Kōkaku until the present, for 
seven generations, every emperor was luckily survived by a son who 
succeeded him. Thus, for more than 200 years the throne has been passing 
smoothly from father to son, an unprecedented phenomenon in the long 
history of the imperial family (if we disregard the mythological emperors, most 
of whom were succeeded by their sons).   
 
A collateral system also existed in shogunal families. When the seventh 
Tokugawa shogun Ietsugu died in 1716, at the age of seven (he became 
shogun at the age of four), without leaving an heir, the 32-year old head of the 
Kii family, a grandson of Tokugawa Ieyasu, succeeded him as Tokugawa 
Yoshimune.  But collateral families, lacking back-up branches of their own, 
faced the danger of extinction. Of the four collateral families of the imperial 
line at the beginning of the nineteenth century, only one, Fushimi, still existed 
a hundred years later. The other three, Kan'in, Katsura, and Arisugawa, died 
out in 1852, 1881, and 1913 respectively, because a lack of heirs.  
 
Reigning Empresses Sustain the Male Line  
The third mechanism to ensure continuity, employed only in the imperial 
family, was to allow a woman, the daughter of an emperor or an imperial 
prince, to ascend the throne sometimes when a male heir could not be found. 
The reigning empresses were virgins or widows, and they could not marry, as 
there could be no one superior to them. They were succeeded by men from 
the male line or, in one case, by another imperial princess. Unlike China, 
where a female emperor was considered to be an aberration (there was only 
one such case there, of Empress Wu, r. 690-705, who was vilified by 
historians), Japan had eight reigning empresses, most of them quite 
prominent. From the late sixth to the late eighth century, six women reigned in 
Japan, two of them ascending the throne twice under different posthumous 
names, a phenomenon which never existed among male monarchs.  
 
The reigning empresses included Suiko (r. 593-628), who promoted 
Buddhism and was the first monarch to assume the title tennō; Jitō (r.686-
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697), who built the first imperial capital Fujiwara-kyō; Gemmei (r.707-715), 
who built the capital Heijō-kyō (Nara) and sponsored the compilation of the 
Kojiki; and Genshō (r. 715-723) who sponsored the compilation of the Nihon 
shoki. Empress Genshō succeeded her mother Empress Gemmei, because 
the father of Genshō, Kusakabe, was an imperial prince, the son of Emperor 
Temmu. After the death of Empress Shōtoku in 770, no woman occupied the 
throne for more than 850 years, because of the fear that the Buddhist clergy 
might manipulate the empress, as had happened in the case of Shōtoku. In 
the Edo period, two reigning empresses again appeared, they were Meishō (r. 
1629-1643) and Go-Sakuramachi (r. 1762-1770).  
 
Meiji: Keeping Concubines, Expanding Collateral Families, and 
Excluding Women from the Throne 
The Meiji Restoration did not abolish the institution of imperial concubines. As 
the emperor was restored to a central position in the modern state, ensuring 
the continuity of his dynasty became a central concern of the government. 
Emperor Meiji's wife Haruko could not bear children, so in 1871, when the 
young emperor was 19, he was provided with two concubines (sokushitsu), 
selected by the empress from among the court ladies (nyokan). Altogether, 
Emperor Meiji had nine concubines. The first two, Hamuro Mitsuko and 
Hashimoto Natsuko, died in 1873 when giving birth to children who also died.  
Of the other seven, Sono Sachiko bore two sons and six daughters, of whom 
only four daughters survived, and Chigusa Kotoko bore two children who died 
shortly after birth. Four concubines, Ogura Fumiko, Katakura Toshiko, 
Anenokoji Yoshiko, and Imazono Ayako, remained childless. Only one 
concubine, Yanagihara Naruko, bore a son, Yoshihito, who despite his 
sickliness reached adulthood and became Emperor Taishō. 
 
As concubines by themselves could not assure continuity, the Meiji 
government expanded the mechanism of collateral families. Between 1870 
and 1906, ten members of the Fushimi family, the only collateral family which 
had not dwindled by that time, were established as imperial princes heading 
new collateral families. These new families were: Nashimoto, Yamashina, 
Kitashirakawa, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Higashikuni, Takeda, and 
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Kan’in. In this way, the extinct Kan’in family was restored, while the two other 
extinctׁfamilies, Katsura and Arisugawa, were not restored. Emperor Meiji’s 
four daughters, and later Emperor Shōwa’s four daughters, married the heads 
of these collateral families.   
 
Although the Meiji leaders maintained the system of imperial concubines and 
expanded the system of collateral families, they abolished the third 
mechanism of ensuring imperial continuity, that of female emperors. Their 
decision to exclude women from the throne contradicted Japanese tradition, 
contradicted their own policy of elevating the status of women through better 
education and modern professions, and contradicted the model of the leading 
western country of that time, Great Britain, where Queen Victoria reigned. 
Some of the private constitution drafts that were circulated in the 1880s 
favored female monarchs (Kornicki 1999:138-41), but the government 
preferred an exclusively male monarchy. The justification for that was that 
women did not serve in the army and therefore could not exercise the 
emperor's new important role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 119 
years after Empress Go-Sakuramachi had stepped down from the throne, the 
Meiji Constitution of 1889, for the first time in Japanese history, banned 
female emperors. Its Article 2 stated: "The Imperial Throne shall be 
succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of 
the Imperial House Law."  
 
Emperor Meiji's wife Haruko enjoyed a higher status than her predecessors. 
She was bestowed the loftiest title of imperial consorts, kōgō, which until then 
had been reserved for consorts who were also daughters of emperors. The 
previous time that such a title had been conferred was in the thirteenth 
century, but from her on it has been bestowed on every wife of an emperor. 
Haruko represented the modern woman. She wore western clothes, 
accompanied her husband on official duties, and was active in promoting 
women's education and social welfare. She set the standard of the modern 
empress, who is involved in state affairs. Despite this progress, as far as 
women’s right to inherit the throne was concerned. the Meiji period marked a 
clear regression. 
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Taishō and Early Shōwa: The End of Concubines 
The glorious institution of imperial concubines, which had existed for more 
than a millennium and a half, came to an end at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. As modern medicine entered the palace, and doctors were allowed to 
touch, treat and inoculate the emperor's children and grandchildren, infant 
mortality in the imperial family dropped sharply. With imperial princes reaching 
maturity, concubines became redundant. The Civil Code of 1898 outlawed 
polygamy, and although Emperor Meiji continued to keep his concubines, his 
son Emperor Taishō became the first monogamous monarch of Japan. 
Taishō's wife Sadako, whom he married in 1900, bore him four robust sons, 
who not only reached maturity but lived long lives. The eldest one, Emperor 
Hirohito, lived and reigned until the unprecedented age of 88. The second 
son, Prince Chichibu died at the age of 51. The third son, Prince Takamatsu, 
lived until the age of 82, and the youngest one, Prince Mikasa, is still alive in 
2006 at the age of 91.  
 
In 1927, shortly after the beginning of the Shōwa era, the court ladies' 
quarters (tsubone) were closed down.  But then, Hirohito’s wife Nagako bore 
four daughters one after the other, and the possibility of an imperial concubine 
was again contemplated. According to Nagako’s biographer Koyama Itoko, 
the young emperor at first favored the idea, but he gave it up when his wife 
objected (Koyama 1958:73-87). The problem was solved in 1933, when 
Nagako, then only 30 years old, bore a son, the future Emperor Akihito. Later, 
she bore another son, Prince Hitachi, and another daughter, altogether two 
boys and five girls, of whom only one daughter died in infancy.  
 
The Allied Occupation Abolishes Collateral Families 
At the end of the Pacific War, when the Japanese feared that the Americans 
might abolish the monarchy and kill the emperor and all his family, the army 
prepared a plan to hide the eight-year old head of the collateral Kitashirakawa 
family, so that in the future he might revive the dynasty (Hata 1994:116-9). 
The war ended before this plan could be implemented and, fortunately for 
Japan, no such measure was needed. 
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The American-led occupation democratized Japan, but it left Hirohito on the 
throne. However, the emperor's status was reduced from that of sovereign to 
that of symbol, and the aristocracy, which had occupied a central part in the 
monarchy, was abolished. Although nobilities existed in several West 
European democracies, the Japanese aristocracy, composed of the old 
nobility and the new peerage, was dissolved. Article 14 of the 1947 
constitution said: "All of the people are equal under the law… Peers and 
peerage shall not be recognized." This single sentence put an end to the 
aristocratic class, which for a millennium and a half had surrounded the 
emperor, served him and controlled him.  
 
The dissolution of the aristocracy led to the abolition of the collateral families. 
As some of the princes who headed these families had held prominent 
positions in the army and navy, the occupation authorities decided to get rid of 
them in order to detach the emperor from the military. However, the emperor 
himself, until recently the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and his 
three brothers, who had occupied senior military positions, were not shorn of 
their titles.  The Imperial House Law (kōshitsu tenpan) of 1947 reduced the 
prewar extended imperial family (kōzoku), which included the heads of the 
collateral families, into a nuclear imperial family (kōshitsu), which consisted 
only of the sons and grandsons of an emperor in the male line, their wives 
and their unmarried daughters. This new definition, which excluded great 
grandsons of emperors from the imperial family, prevented the reappearance 
of new collateral families. 
 
On 18 October 1947, eleven former princes, heads of the disbanded collateral 
families, visited the palace to bid farewell to Emperor Hirohito, Empress 
Nagako, and Empress Dowager Sadako. They and their families had become, 
like the rest of the aristocracy, commoners. From then on, any marriage of an 
imperial prince or princess had to be with a commoner, as the imperial family 
was too small to enable marriages among its members. The new Imperial 
House Law asserted that a commoner woman who marries a prince joins the 
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imperial family and becomes a princess, while an imperial princess who 
marries a commoner leaves the family and becomes a commoner.  
 
The Imperial House Law Retains the Exclusion of Women  
The 1947 constitution established the equality of sexes. Article 14 said that 
“there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status or 
family origin.” Accordingly, unlike the Meiji Constitution, the new constitution 
said nothing about the gender of the emperor. However, the new Imperial 
House Law, which was enacted together with the constitution, preserved the 
male monarchy. Article 1 of that law stated that the throne “shall be 
succeeded by male descendants in the male line.” Thus the exclusion of 
women from the throne was not abolished, but only shifted from the 
constitution, which is difficult to change, to a law, which can be changed by a 
simple majority in the Diet. 
 
Why did the American-led occupation, which wished to establish gender 
equality, endorse the limitation of the throne to men? The rationale provided 
by the Meiji leaders, that women could not become emperors because they 
could not command the armed forces, was not valid anymore, as the link 
between the emperor and the military had been severed. The exclusively 
male monarchy was probably retained in order to placate the conservatives, 
who had been forced to swallow many changes in the emperor's status. In 
addition, enabling women to reign would have opened the controversial issue 
of whether, on the basis of gender equality, to discard the venerated male line 
and allow the possibility of a female line. The occupation authorities preferred 
to defer this question to future generations. 
 
Without concubines, without reigning empresses, without collateral families, 
and with a reduced imperial family, the continuity of the dynasty now 
depended on the ability of a few young princesses to produce sons. This 
situation created the risk that there might come a time when there would be 
no one to ascend the throne.  In the first postwar decades this risk looked 
remote. When the law was enacted, Emperor Hirohito had two sons, Akihito 
and Masahito (Prince Hitachi), while his brother Prince Mikasa had one son, 
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Tomohito. By 1965, Crown Prince Akihito's wife Michiko had born two sons, 
Naruhito and Fumihito (Prince Akishino), while the Mikasa couple had 
produced two more sons, Yoshihito (Prince Katsura) and Norihito (Prince 
Takamado), all of them qualified to succeed the throne.  
 
Yet, the unusual phenomenon of fertile imperial consorts, which had existed 
for three consecutive generations in the twentieth century, came to an end. 
Infertility has been a constant occurrence in the imperial family. Of Emperor 
Taishō’s four sons, only two (Hirohito and Mikasa) begot children, while the 
other two (Chichibu and Takamatsu) were childless. Of Emperor Hirohito’s 
two sons only one (Akihito) had children, while the other one (Hitachi) 
remained childless; and of Emperor Akihito’s two sons only one (Akishino) 
had children shortly after marriage, while the other one (Crown Prince 
Naruhito) remained childless for eight years.  
 
The Lack of Sons Prompts a Search for Solutions 
By the end of the twentieth century, the danger which fifty years earlier had 
looked remote was assuming the proportions of a crisis. From the time of 
Prince Akishino's birth in 1965 until the end of the century, eight girls were 
born in the imperial family (Princess Nori, daughter of Akihito and Michiko; 
Princesses Mako and Kako, daughters of Prince Akishino and Princess Kiko; 
two daughters of Prince Mikasa's eldest son Tomohito; and three daughters of 
Mikasa's youngest son Prince Takamado). But at that same time no boy was 
born. That meant that if no more sons were born, there would be no one to 
succeed Naruhito or his brother Akishino when they are gone some time in 
the mid-twenty first century.  
 
Had the collateral families existed, one of their heads might succeed the 
throne. The collateral family closest to the emperor before 1945 was 
Higashikuni. In 1915 the first Higashikuni Prince, Naruhiko, married Emperor 
Meiji's daughter Toshiko. Thirty years later, when Japan surrendered, he 
served as prime minister. In 1943, Naruhiko's son, Morihiro, married Hirohito's 
eldest daughter Shigeko. They had three sons and two daughters, and all 
their sons have had sons of their own. Had the Higashikuni family retained its 
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collateral status, Morihiro's eldest grandson could marry one of the imperial 
princesses and become emperor. But once the collateral system was 
abolished it is difficult to restore it. There were many cases in the past of 
imperial princes who were demoted to the status of subjects, but there was 
hardly a case of a subject who rose to become an imperial prince. 
 
By the end of the twentieth century it seemed that the continuity of the 
imperial dynasty hinged on the ability of Crown Princess Masako to produce a 
son. The psychological pressure on her was great, but for a long time she 
could not bear children. In December 2001, after eight years of marriage and 
an abortion, Masako gave birth to a girl, Princess Aiko (second name: 
Princess Toshi). In 2003, Masako dropped from public view and ceased to 
fulfill her official duties. It was reported that she was suffering from depression 
(euphemistically dubbed “adjustment disorder”). Her depression was 
attributed to the failure to bear a son and to the difficulty to adjust to court life 
after giving up her former career as a diplomat.  
 
In December 2004, when Princess Masako reached the age of 41 and her 
chances to bear more children became dim, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō 
appointed a 10-member advisory panel to recommend legal changes that 
would guarantee the continuity of the dynasty. The panel was composed of 
establishment figures. It was headed by 71-year old Yoshikawa Hiroyuki, a 
former president of Tokyo University and an expert on robot engineering. His 
deputy was 75-year old Sonobe Itsuo, a former judge of the Supreme Court, 
who was a member of the Imperial Household Council and an expert on the 
Imperial House Law. There were two women on the panel: Ogata Sadako, 
former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and Iwao Sumiko, a sociologist 
and authority on gender issues. The other six members were: Tokyo 
University President Sasaki Takeshi, constitutional scholar Satō Kōji, western 
classics scholar Kubo Masaaki, ancient Japanese history scholar Sasayama 
Haruo, Toyota Motor Corporation chairman Okuda Hiroshi, and former Deputy 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Furukawa Teijirō. Of the ten members, only two, 
Sonobe and Sasayama, were authorities on imperial family affairs.  
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Controversial Recommendations  
The panel met once a month for about an hour or two each time. It heard 
experts, but refused to hear the views of members of the imperial family, on 
the grounds that they were irrelevant.  In November 2005, eleven months 
after its appointment, the panel submitted a report. Despite its conservative 
composition, the panel's report was radical. Basing its recommendations on 
the principles of gender equality and the wishes of the people, it rejected the 
ideas of reviving concubinage and collateral families as undemocratic and 
unpopular. Instead, it recommended allowing women to become emperors. 
This recommendation by itself was not revolutionary as there had been 
reigning empresses in the past. But the panel went further and recommended 
that the first-born child of an emperor or empress, regardless of its sex, 
succeed the throne, something which had never existed before. It also 
recommended that imperial princesses who marry commoners remain in the 
imperial family and their husbands join it and become imperial princes. The 
most revolutionary recommendation was that reigning empresses would be 
allowed to marry a commoner and have their offspring succeed them. This 
meant the end to the exclusive male line and the start of a female line. 
 
Although these recommendations were radical departures from the past, 
public opinion supported them and the conservative prime minister endorsed 
them. The cabinet started preparations for amending the Imperial House Law 
according to the panel's report. Had the law been amended, Princess Aiko 
would have become the heir to her father, even if a son was later born in the 
imperial family. She would then be able to marry a commoner and their first 
child, whether boy or girl, would succeed her.  
 
But not everyone in Japan was happy with the panel's report. The right-
wingers and traditionalists were outraged. The opposition to the 
recommendations was led by the Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja 
honchō), whose president Kuni Kuniaki, a nephew of Hirohito’s wife Nagako, 
was the chief priest of Ise Shrine. Together with conservative 
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parliamentarians and activists it established the Japan Congress (Nihon 
kaigi), which organized rallies and collected petitions against a female 
emperor and a female line. The Japan Congress claimed that the panel's 
recommendations, far from saving the dynasty, were actually killing it. Instead 
of reigning empresses and a female line, the Congress advocated the idea of 
reviving the collateral families, which could provide male heirs to the throne. 
Its spokesmen dismissed the argument that public opinion supported the 
recommendations, claiming that the ill-informed public could hardly distinguish 
between a female emperor (jotei) and a female line (jokei). The Japan 
Congress maintained that the imperial dynasty did not belong only to the 
present generation, but also to the past and future ones. Therefore cardinal 
change of the succession rules required long and serious deliberations by 
experts and could not be decided hastily by a group of amateurs.  
 
The emperor was not allowed to express his opinion, because this was a 
political issue, and his immediate relatives also kept silent. Only one member 
of the imperial family, Tomohito, the eldest son and heir of Prince Mikasa, 
broke the silence. In magazine articles and interviews he voiced his strong 
opposition to the panel's report. He rejected the idea of reigning empresses 
and a female line and recommended the revival of concubinage and the 
restoration of collateral families. His suggestions were ridiculed by liberals, but 
were applauded by traditionalists and right wingers. It was difficult to guess to 
what extent, if at all, he represented the views of the imperial family.   
 
The Birth of Hisahito Nullifies the Panel's Recommendations  
The impasse was broken by the surprising announcement, in February 2006, 
that the 39-year old Princess Kiko, wife of Prince Akishino and mother of two 
teenage girls, was expecting a baby. The prospect that an imperial heir might, 
after all, be born convinced Prime Minister Koizumi to suspend his initiative to 
amend the law. The conservative camp was saved from a serious split. 
Feminists and liberals were disappointed, but traditionalists were relieved. 
When Princess Kiko gave birth to a boy on 6 September 2006, there was a 
general elation. As the newborn baby was just a child of a prince, it was given 
only one name, Hisahito, unlike the sons and daughters of the emperor and 
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the crown prince, who are given two names (Naruhito was also Prince Hiro, 
Aiko is also Princess Toshi). Hisahito became No. 3 in the line of succession, 
after his uncle Naruhito and his father Akishino. He precedes Prince Hitachi, 
the emperor’s brother (No. 4); Prince Mikasa, Hirohito’s brother (No. 5); 
Tomohito, Prince Mikasa's eldest son (No. 6); and Prince Katsura, Prince 
Mikasa's second son (No. 7). Prince Mikasa's third son, Prince Takamado, 
who should have been No. 8, died in 2002 of a heart attack.  
 
Two weeks after the birth of the new prince, a political "prince", Abe Shinzō, 
the grandson of former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, succeeded Koizumi as 
prime minister. Being more conservative than Koizumi, Abe shelved the 
recommendations of the advisory panel, and the prospect of reigning 
empresses or a female line for the time disappeared. Considering the 
longevity of the Japanese, which is now the highest in the world, male 
successors to the Japanese throne seem to be guaranteed until the end of 
this century. Yet, the dependence of the dynasty on the survival of one 
person, who is still a baby, and on his ability in the future to father a son, 
leaves the imperial dynasty in a precarious position. If a female line is not 
going to be adopted, collateral families will have to be restored in some form.  
 
A few days after the inauguration of the Abe cabinet, Deputy Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Shimomura Hakubun announced that the cabinet would not be 
constrained by the report of the advisory panel, but would seek new ways to 
ensure a "stable male-line succession of emperors." He called on Diet 
members to join a new parliamentarians' league for preserving the "traditional 
imperial succession rules" (The Japan Times, 1 October 2006). The league, 
formed in October 2006 and headed by former agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries minister Shimamura Yoshinobu, numbered 201 Diet members, from 
both the LDP and the opposition Democratic Party. Its purpose was to find  
ways to revive the discarded collateral system, so that female emperors and a 
female line would not be necessary.   
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Will The Crown Prince Abdicate the Throne? 
How will the birth of Hisahito affect the crown prince and princess? As the 
pressure on Princess Masako to bear an heir has been removed, she may 
regain her health and get out of the depression. She may be relieved that her 
daughter Princess Aiko is not going to become a reigning empress, and 
therefore there is no need to worry about her "imperial education" (teiō 
kyōiku), her marriage prospects, and her future responsibilities. The little 
princess can grow up almost as a normal child. Nevertheless, Crown Princess 
Masako is still destined to become an emperor's wife, with all the burdens 
involved in that positions. Is she willing to shoulder these burdens? If she 
overcomes her depression, adjusts to court life, and feels relaxed in 
exercising her public duties, the answer is yes. But if she continues to be 
depressed, finds it difficult to conform to palace life, craves for privacy for 
herself and her daughter, and finds her public duties boring and meaningless, 
she may not be interested in becoming an emperor's wife.  
 
The birth of Hisahito may alleviate Princess Masako's depression, but it may 
also aggravate it. With her sister-in-law Princess Kiko receiving public praise 
for her loyalty to the imperial family, her self sacrifice for the nation, her cordial 
relations with the emperor and empress, her cheerful personality, and her 
fertility, Princess Masako may feel frustrated for allegedly representing the 
opposite attributes. The relations between the two princesses, so different in 
their personalities and former careers, are far from cordial. The success of 
Princess Kiko to accomplish what Princess Masako has failed to do may 
exacerbate the feelings of bitterness and make the crown princess wish to 
leave the imperial family.  
 
Before the announcement of Princess Kiko's pregnancy, some weekly 
magazines speculated about the possibility of a divorce. Some people 
suggested that the crown prince should divorce his wife in order to marry 
another woman who would adjust to palace life and bear him a son. Others 
gossiped that the crown princess wanted to divorce in order to escape her 
ordeal. If these reports are true, then in both cases this move was blocked by 
Naruhito, who loves his wife and does not want to divorce her. 
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If Princess Masako decides to leave the imperial family, Naruhito will face the 
choice of either agreeing to a divorce or following her outside the family. At 
their wedding, he promised to protect her with all his might, so he may prefer 
the second option. This will mean resigning the position of crown prince. In 
that case, his brother will become crown prince and the throne will pass 
smoothly from father to son, which means from Akihito to Akishino and from 
Akishino to Hisahito.  
 
Abdication of emperors was quite frequent in the past. Until the nineteenth 
century, nearly half of the Japanese emperors resigned either of their own will 
or on the demands of the people in power. But abdication of a crown prince is 
hardly known. The Imperial House Law does not mention abdication, but this 
does not mean that it is banned. After Japan's defeat in 1945, there were calls 
on Hirohito to assume responsibility for the war and resign, and he himself 
contemplated it, but General McArthur and the Japanese government 
opposed this move out of fear that it might create turmoil and bring about 
Hirohito's prosecution (Shillony 2005:217-219).  
 
Naruhito's abdication, still a mere speculation, will cause problems. It will be 
seen as a scandal and will embarrass the imperial family and the Imperial 
Houusehold Agency. It will require that Prince Akishino receive belatedly the 
"imperial education" which he is allegedly lacking, although there was little 
difference between the educations that the two brothers have received. In the 
long run, all sides may be satisfied. Princess Kiko may be happy to perform 
the public duties of a crown princess and an empress, and Princess Masako 
may be happy to regain a normal life.  
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A Royal Alliance: Court Diplomacy and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 
1900-41 
 
Antony Best 
 
In the first half of the twentieth century probably the most important royal 
relationship that Britain had was the one with Imperial Japan. This might seem 
a strange comment, but it should be recalled that after the collapse of empires 
of the Romanovs, the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs in 1917-18 only 
Britain, Japan and Italy remained as monarchical Great Powers. The royal 
relationship with Japan was important, because in contrast to the Italian case, 
the relations between the two courts clearly had an overt political purpose. 
During the years of the alliance, in an attempt to signify mutual respect, the 
very highest decorations were exchanged and royal princes from both 
countries set out on formal visits that took them to the other side of the world. 
Moreover, even after the alliance ended these ties continued into the inter-war 
period and were still used as a way of indicating that close ties of friendship 
still existed. To look at why this royal relationship with Japan became so 
important to Britain is therefore a useful way of comprehending the nature of 
the larger Anglo-Japanese relationship.1  
 
In order to understand why royal diplomacy came to play such an important 
role, one needs to begin in the late nineteenth century. During this period 
Japan was engaged in a major effort to modernize itself. As well as engaging 
in industrialization and the construction of a modern state apparatus, this also 
meant turning away from the ceremonial practices of the Sinocentric world. 
Accordingly, the Japanese monarchy sought to co-opt some of the customs 
and rituals of the courts in Europe. Thus, the Emperor began to wear 
Western-style military dress, which emphasized his link with the newly formed 
conscription army, while the nobility was organized into a British-based order 
of precedence.2 These efforts to make Japan the equal of the Europeans 
were, however, compromised by the patronizing treatment that the Japanese 
court received at the hands of the West. A particular sinner in this respect was 
Britain. For example, in 1887 when Queen Victoria marked the fiftieth 
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anniversary of her accession to the throne, the Japanese representative at the 
celebrations, Prince Komatsu, felt insulted by the inadequate welcome he 
received at British hands.3  
 
The result of these perceived slights was that Japan developed a great 
sensitivity where royal relations were concerned. For example, in 1897 the 
Japanese only agreed to send a representative to the Queen’s diamond 
jubilee once Britain had guaranteed that he would be given the same 
treatment as European royalty.4 Thus, even before the alliance was signed in 
January 1902, it was clear that one criterion by which Japan would judge 
foreign countries would be how the latter treated the Emperor and his family. 
The obvious corollary to this was that if a Western country sought to develop 
a close relationship with Japan, it had to be aware that extraordinary scrutiny 
would be applied to the formal aspects of diplomacy to ensure that relations 
were being carried out on the basis of equality. At the same time, however, 
this also implied that Japan might be susceptible to flattery and that stressing 
royal ties might be a way of cementing the political relationship.  
  
Certainly it seems that even when the alliance was being negotiated, Britain 
was aware of the importance of using the Court as a symbol of its good 
intentions. Moreover, this task was made considerably easier by the fact that 
King Edward VII was broadly favourable to the alignment with Japan.5 Thus, 
when the leading Japanese politician, Hirobumi Ito, came to Britain in 
December 1901, he was invited for an audience with the King and was 
presented with the Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (GCB).6 In the 
following year at the time of the King’s coronation, the Japanese 
representatives were treated with considerable attention in order to ensure 
that their amour propre was not disturbed in any way.  For example, the royal 
suite was housed in Claridges at the Foreign Office’s expense, even though 
this was considerably more expensive than other hotels.7  
  
The early years of the alliance were, however, still marked on the British side 
by continued ambivalence about what attitude to take towards non-European 
monarchs. For example, in 1902-3 those closely involved in diplomacy with 
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Japan called for the Order of the Garter to be presented to the Meiji Emperor.8 
This request could not have come at a worse moment for the whole issue of 
whether this most esteemed decoration could be presented to non-Christian 
monarchs was in the balance in the summer and autumn of 1902 due to what 
became known as ‘the Shah and Garter’ episode. The question of whether the 
Shah of Persia should be made a Knight of the Garter was finally settled in 
favour of his sponsor, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, but the price 
Edward VII that demanded for his acquiescence was that no further requests 
were to be entertained.9 Thus the Meiji Emperor was denied.  
 
This situation only changed when Japan, through its defeat of Russia in the 
war of 1904-5, unequivocally demonstrated that it was no mere Oriental 
potentate. In January 1905, as Japanese victory over Russia appeared ever 
more likely, the issue of whether the Garter should be presented to the Meiji 
Emperor was raised again.10 At this point ministers approved the idea in 
principle but it was only at war’s end in September 1905, and with the alliance 
just renewed, that the idea was put to the King. This time Edward VII proved 
more amenable and agreed that a Garter mission led by Prince Arthur of 
Connaught should travel to Japan in the following year.11 
  
With Prince Arthur’s mission the royal relationship between the two countries 
entered a new stage, for this began a tradition of high-ranking official visits 
that would continue into the inter-war period. The result was that, although the 
two royal houses did not share any dynastic links or even the same religion, a 
special bond began to develop, which was not seen in the British court’s ties 
with any other non-European dynasty. That is not to say, however, that the 
relationship evolved smoothly eschewing all difficulties, for there was a wide 
geographical and cultural divide that had to be bridged. Geography was 
important because the most significant type of state visit, one by the reigning 
monarch, could not be contemplated. Thus all missions had to be carried out 
by princes representing the sovereign. This created problems because the 
royal houses of Europe had developed very particular codes of conduct and 
precedence in their dealings with each other. How a royal prince was to be 
treated when on an official visit to another country was seen as entirely 
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dependent on his status within his own court. However, these gradations of 
ceremony and ritual were sometimes lost on the Japanese, leading to 
embarrassing incidents. 
  
This trait first manifested itself in Prince Arthur’s visit to Japan in 1906, when 
the Japanese decided to assign its most senior military figures to his suite as 
a sign of respect for their ally. However, as Prince Arthur was only the King’s 
nephew this was clearly inappropriate for someone of his standing. Yet no 
complaint or correction was made, for fear that this might appear ungrateful. 
The consequences became clear the next year when the Emperor’s 
representative, Prince Fushimi, came on an official visit to London to express 
the Emperor’s gratitude at receiving the Garter. Fearing that offence would be 
given if the previous year’s practice were not reciprocated, those responsible 
for relations with Japan decided to provide Fushimi with a reception that 
strictly speaking was too grand for someone of his rank. For example, Field 
Marshal Lord Roberts and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Edward Seymour were 
attached to his suite, and he was awarded the distinction of an official 
welcome to the City of London. This break with European precedence created 
unease at court, for the King was a stickler for protocol and let it be known 
that ‘a regular day in the city with troops lining the streets etc., is too much for 
Prince Fushimi’.12 Thus, officials were forced into the unenviable task of 
charting a course between a suspicious Japan and a disgruntled King.       
  
Moreover, Japan’s continuing sensitivity about how it was perceived by the 
West also led to other difficulties. A notable example during Fushimi’s visit 
was that, to their horror, officials at the Japanese embassy in London learnt 
shortly before the prince’s arrival that a new D’Oyly Carte production of The 
Mikado, was about to open. Briefed on the offence that this would give, the 
British Lord Chamberlain’s Office promptly moved into action to suppress the 
production. Further panic ensued when it was realised that the conductors of 
military bands might well think that tunes from The Mikado might provide an 
appropriate welcome to the Japanese prince. A hint to the contrary was 
therefore urgently conveyed to the Services.13   
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Despite these problems, the rise of political and commercial disputes between 
Britain and Japan in the late 1900s and into the 1910s meant that if anything 
the relationship between the two courts became even more important, 
because they acted as a useful means of ameliorating tension. This was 
aided by circumstance, for this difficult period coincided with the deaths of the 
two monarchs. The relatively short space of time that elapsed between the 
death of Edward VII in 1910 and that of Meiji in 1912 created in the form of 
funerals and coronations a number of ceremonial occasions in which Britain 
and Japan could demonstrate their mutual respect.14 The frequency and 
grandeur of these events meant that the royal relationship now came to be 
seen as the personification of the close ties that existed between the two 
countries.  
 
The start of the Great War at first reduced contact between the courts to 
telegraphic communications of goodwill, but because the conflict also led to 
political tensions arising, it was still necessary to play the royal card. The 
ultimate use of the court as a method for signalling continued friendship in the 
midst of trouble thus came in 1918 when the British decided to honour the 
Taisho Emperor by making him a Field Marshal, the first non-European to be 
honoured in such a manner. This plan originated with Major F.S.G. Piggott, 
who had previously received language training in Japan. Piggott was 
concerned that there had been little acknowledgement of Japan’s help in the 
Great War and feared the effect that this might have on the alliance. He 
therefore argued that a gesture was urgently needed to make the Japanese 
feel appreciated.15 Indeed, this suggestion came at a crucial point during the 
conflict, for by the end of 1917 Britain, despite its disappointment at the lack of 
Japanese assistance to the point, hoped that Japan might send forces to help 
bring stability to post-revolution Siberia. At first, there was some talk of 
sending a political mission at the same time as the military mission that would 
carry out the field marshal’s baton for Taisho. However, after a long debate, it 
was decided to rely on a military mission alone, led once again by Prince 
Arthur. Very deliberately, all the officers chosen for the mission, including the 
prince himself, had served on the Western Front and during the visit, in order 
to emphasise this point, they wore khaki rather than ceremonial dress. The 
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effect was profound. Immediately after the visit, the British ambassador in 
Tokyo, reported to the Foreign Office that: 
 
… it seems to me that the Prince’s visit has been the very best kind of 
propaganda, because it made people think well of Britain, and yet 
made them do so unconsciously … it has … given British and 
Japanese alike an opportunity of drawing closer together, and of thus 
re-forging links which the wear and tear of warfare had perhaps tended 
to impair.16 
 
The visit thus underlined the power of royal symbolism as a tool in this 
relationship. 
  
The Japanese again reciprocated, this time with a visit to London by Prince 
Higashifumi in October 1918. This, however, was low-key compared to 
Japan’s next gesture, for in 1921 the Japanese court sent the young Crown 
Prince, Hirohito, on a European tour with Britain as his main port of call. The 
decision to send Hirohito to Britain was in part for educational reasons and 
also perhaps reflected tensions at court about his choice of bride.17 However, 
it is also difficult not to believe that his tour was intended to have a political 
purpose, for his arrival coincided with a prolonged debate in London about 
whether or not Britain should renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Certainly 
officials in Whitehall interpreted the visit as being political in nature, and as the 
future of the alliance was very much in doubt, they responded by doing their 
best to de-politicise the visit. For example, great care was taken to ensure that 
the British speeches of welcome from that by the King down to addresses by 
municipal mayors lauded the alliance’s past but did not predict the future.18  
  
In the end a decision to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance was made at 
the Washington conference of 1921-22. This did not, however, lead to any 
substantial diminishing of the role played by relations between the two royal 
houses. The end of the alliance was not, after all, supposed to indicate a 
parting of ways brought about by profound differences over policy, but rather 
was presented as merely an acknowledgement that defence pacts were 
anachronistic in the age of ‘new diplomacy’. Britain and Japan, it was 
emphasized, were still friendly powers, and to prove that this was indeed the 
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case, the royal relationship had to continue to prosper. The post-alliance era 
thus began with as clear a signal as could be made – a reciprocal visit by the 
Prince of Wales to Japan in 1922.  
  
The visit was an interesting affair because the Prince of Wales brought with 
him a very new image of what royalty could be. The young energetic prince 
had already shown a gift for informality, and he demonstrated it on this tour 
by, in one well-publicized incident, riding a bicycle in front of an adoring 
crowd.19 This kind of behaviour was accepted, within limits, by British court 
officials for it helped to humanize the royal family. This, after all, was an 
important task in an age of democracy and mass media, particularly when one 
recalls that most of the major royal houses in Europe had been extinguished 
at the end of the Great War. Some of the Japanese court could also see 
potential in such an image and as a result Hirohito, who was only seven years 
younger than the Prince of Wales, was encouraged to join in a game of golf 
with the British visitors. Moreover, to add an extra popular touch the media, 
whether spontaneously or as the result of a briefing is unclear, talked of the 
supposed friendship that had developed between the two heirs to the throne. 
The result was that the royal visit proved to be marked success. Moreover, it 
even raised the prospect, as one British newspaper put it, of Britain acquiring 
a new responsibility, namely teaching the Japanese house how to act as a 
constitutional monarchy, which was surely a fitting role in this democratic 
post-alliance era.20  
 
The reality of the tour, however, was somewhat different. In truth the Prince of 
Wales thought that Hirohito, whose golfing skills were negligible, was ‘dippy’ 
and told the British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Charles Eliot, that the Japanese 
royal family were ‘a queer set of creatures’, whose only role seemed to be to 
act as national mascots.21 The prince’s sharp tongue appears to have been 
precipitated by his resentment of the stuffy formality of the Japanese court, 
which he had found impossibly over-prescriptive. One of the prince’s suite, 
Lord Louis Mountbatten, observed on leaving Japan that he felt that had 
regained his ‘freedom of speech’; the Prince of Wales was blunter, for 
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according to one source, his last words on departure were ‘Thank God that’s 
the last of the bloody Japanese!’22  
 
Problems arose out of this discrepancy between the media image and the 
actual sentiments of the prince, for once the myth of friendship had been 
invented it had to be perpetuated. The difficulty here was that with the alliance 
now a thing of the past, both the prince and his father, King George, proved to 
be less willing than before to put themselves out for the sake of Anglo-
Japanese relations. For example, in 1924 Hirohito’s long-delayed wedding 
finally took place. In accordance with the previous stress on the importance of 
the royal relationship, Eliot recommended that a royal prince should attend, 
but George V promptly vetoed the idea, and then, to Eliot’s consternation, 
even proved sticky on the question of whether he and the Prince of Wales 
should send presents.23 Moreover, neither side showed any enthusiasm for 
the idea that the British court should teach the ways of constitutional 
monarchy to their Japanese counterparts.   
 
The lull in the royal relationship was, however, short-lived, for from 1925-30 it 
revived in a new burst of activity. As with prior periods of frequent contact the 
reasons for this were essentially political. In 1925 the international order in 
East Asia that had been created at the Washington conference was 
challenged by the rise of Chinese nationalism. Britain and Japan, who both 
suffered at the hands of the Chinese nationalists, showed great uncertainty 
during these years about the attitude of the other. Both hoped that the other 
could be persuaded to co-operate in resisting the Chinese, but felt no 
confidence that this aspiration would come to fruition. In such an atmosphere 
making overt calls for assistance was unrealistic, for there was fear of 
rejection, and as a result both sought to use the royal relationship as a means 
of indicating their continuing favour. This manifested itself most obviously in 
the decision by the British government in 1929 to send a Garter Mission to 
Japan, where it made a considerable impact on public opinion. In return, 
Emperor Hirohito in the following year despatched one of his younger 
brothers, Prince Takamatsu, to Britain to convey his gratitude to King George. 
Accompanying these visits, decorations and presents were liberally distributed 
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among court officials in order to oil the waters and, of course, due attention 
was paid by the British to royal protocol to ensure that nothing was done that 
might cause offence.24 
 
In the end, however, this effort to use the royal channel as a means of 
signalling the desire for closer ties produced no substantial results, apart from 
a general sense of goodwill. This is not surprising, for the political and 
economic interests that the two countries had in China were by this time 
beginning to diverge, and no mere act of politesse could change that fact. 
However, it is an interesting comment on the role of royal relations that such 
an effort should even have been made, for it implies that officials were still apt 
to believe that the court relationship could continue to play a political role. This 
perhaps was a reflection of the fact that by the middle of the 1920s some 
commentators, including on a number of occasions the Prime Minister, 
Stanley Baldwin, began to talk about the alliance being dead but its spirit 
living on.25 If that was taken on trust, then it surely followed that this spirit 
dwelt above all in the royal relationship, which had never been sullied by the 
expediency that had affected political ties and, moreover, that any 
resurrection of the alliance would have to begin in the royal sphere.    
 
Following the flurry of activity in the late 1920s, political events in the 1930s, 
such as the Manchurian crisis of 1931-33, pushed the relationship into the 
doldrums. However, it is noteworthy that, when in 1936-37 there was again 
some hope of rapprochement, the pattern that had appeared in the late 1920s 
repeated itself. Beginning with the memorial service for George V in February 
1936 and running on until the coronation of King George VI in May 1937, the 
Japanese began to signal through royal diplomacy that they were prepared to 
enter into closer relations if Britain was willing to reciprocate. Recognising the 
signals emanating from Tokyo, the British responded in kind and tried to 
provide as warm a reception as possible to the Emperor’s brother, Prince 
Chichibu, when he arrived to represent Japan at the coronation. Again, these 
efforts failed to bring about any substantial results, for the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 created a momentum that pushed Britain 
and Japan towards a sundering of relations rather than their repair.26       
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The royal relationship was not, of course, strong enough to prevent Britain 
and Japan from going to war, but that does not mean that it should treated as 
playing an insignificant and peripheral role in the ties between the two 
countries. From the signing of the alliance in 1902 until Chichibu’s attendance 
at the coronation in 1937, royal diplomacy was used by both states as a 
means of communicating goodwill. Politicians, court officials and diplomats all 
recognized its importance and allocated much time to ensuring that the royal 
channel was working smoothly. In a relationship full of crises, it is easy to 
overlook what might seem to be mere arcane protocol, but the world of court 
relations has much to tell us about the nature of Anglo-Japanese relations in 
their most dramatic years.    
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